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Abstract. Vehicle safety depends on (a) the range of identified hazards and (b)
the operational situations for which mitigations of these hazards are acceptably
decreasing risk. Moreover, with an increasing degree of autonomy, risk ownership
is likely to increase for vendors towards regulatory certification. Hence, highly
automated vehicles have to be equipped with verified controllers capable of reli-
ably identifying and mitigating hazards in all possible operational situations. To
this end, available methods for the design and verification of automated vehicle
controllers have to be supported by models for hazard analysis and mitigation.
In this paper, we describe (1) a framework for the analysis and design of planners
(i.e., high-level controllers) capable of run-time hazard identification and mitiga-
tion, (2) an incremental algorithm for constructing planning models from hazard
analysis, and (3) an exemplary application to the design of a fail-operational
controller based on a given control system architecture. Our approach equips the
safety engineer with concepts and steps to (2a) elaborate scenarios of endanger-
ment and (2b) design operational strategies for mitigating such scenarios.
Keywords: risk analysis, hazard mitigation, safe state, controller design, au-
tonomous vehicle, automotive system, modeling, planning
1 Challenges, Background, and Contribution
Automated and autonomous vehicles (AV) are responsible for avoiding mishaps and
even for mitigating hazardous situations in as many operational situations as possible.
Hence, AVs are examples of systems where the identification (2a) and mitigation (2b)
of hazards have to be highly automated. This circumstance makes these systems even
more complex and difficult to design. Thus, safety engineers require specific models
and methods for risk analysis and mitigation.
As an example, we consider manned road vehicles in road traffic with an autopilot
(AP) feature. Such vehicles are able to automatically conduct a ride only given some
valid target and minimizing human intervention. The following AV-level (S)afety (G)oal
specifies the problem we want to focus on in this paper:
SG: The AV can always reach a safest possible state σ wrt. the hazards identi-
fied and present in a specific operational situation os .
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Table 1: Examples of endangerment scenarios and mitigation strategies.
Possible Mitigation StrategyScenario of
Endangerment Vehicle Driver RoadEnv
Vehicle subsystem
fault
dependability
pattern
controlled
shutdown
car2x com.,
digital road signs
Driver maloperation passive safety safe reaction (if controllable)
RoadEnv
unforeseen
obstacle
emergency
braking assistant
braking or
circumvention
digital road signs,
x2car com.
IT attack security pattern safe reaction (if controllable)
Background. Adopted from [4,9], we give a brief overview of terms used in this pa-
per: We perceive a mishap as an event of harm, injury, damage, or loss. A hazard (or
hazardous state) is an event that can lead to a mishap. We consider hazards to be fac-
torable. Hence, a hazard can play the role of a causal factor of another hazard or a
mishap. We denote causal factors, hazards, and mishaps—i.e., the elements of a causal
(event) chain—by the term safety risk (risk state or risk for short). We perceive the part
of a causal chain increasing risk as an endangerment scenario, and the part of a causal
chain decreasing risk as a mitigation strategy. Table 1 exemplifies different endanger-
ment scenarios and how these can be mitigated using corresponding strategies.
Mitigation strategies can be seen as specific system-level safety requirements imple-
mented by a given control system architecture. We assume that a control system archi-
tecture consists of features deployed on sensors, actuators, and software components
running on networked computing units (cf. Fig. 4a). By traditional driver assistance
(TDA), we refer to driver assistance features already in the field, e.g. adaptive cruise
control (ACC) and lane keeping assistance (LKA).
We distinguish between the domains vehicle, driver, and road environment. For
highly and fully automated driving, not all domains have to be considered. For example,
in full automation (e.g. level 5 in [12]), the vehicle has to operate under all road and
environmental conditions manageable by a human driver and therefore a driver does not
have to be taken into account.
Contribution. Elaborating on previous work in [5,6], we contribute
(1) a framework for modeling, analysis, and design of planners (i.e., high-level con-
trollers) capable of run-time hazard identification and mitigation, and
(2) a procedure for constructing planning models from hazard analysis.
For this, we formalize the core engineering steps necessary for (2a) the identification
and analysis of scenarios of endangerment and (2b) the design of operational miti-
gation strategies. Using an exemplary AV, we incrementally build up a risk structure
involving three hazards in the vehicle domain, as well as several strategies to reach safe
states in presence of these hazards. We discuss approaches to model reduction suited
for run-time hazard analysis and mitigation planning where efficient identification of
operational situations and acting therein play a crucial role.
In this paper, we discuss related work in Section 2, our abstraction in Section 3,
and our modeling framework in Section 4. Section 5 shows a procedure for building a
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hazard mitigation planning model. We present an AV example in Section 6, discuss our
approach in Section 7, and conclude in Section 8.
2 Related Work
Among the related formal methods available in robotics planning, embedded systems,
and automated vehicle control, we only discuss a few more recent ones and highlight
how we can improve over them.
Gu¨demann and Ortmeier [7] present a language for probabilistic system model-
ing for safety analysis. Formalized as MARKOV decision processes (MDP), they pro-
pose two ways of failure mode modeling (i.e., per-time and per-demand failure modes),
and two ways of deductive cause consequence reasoning (i.e., quantitative and qualita-
tive). Their model and reasoning can extend our approach. However, our work (i) adds
stronger guidelines on how to build planning models and (ii) puts hazard analysis into
the context of autonomous systems and mitigation planning.
Eastwood et al. [3] present an algorithm for finding permissive robot action plans
optimal w.r.t. to safety and performance. They employ partially observable MDPs
(helpful in regarding uncertainty and robot limitations) to model robot behavior, and
two abstractions from this model to capture a system’s modes and hazards. Our frame-
work uses three layers of abstraction (Σs, Σp, Σ), operational situations to capture
control modes, and a structure to capture hazards. While they directly encode hazard
severity for plan selection, our framework allows the planner to calculate the risk pri-
ority based on a causal event tree towards mishaps. As opposed to complete behavioral
planning, our approach focuses the construction of mitigation planning models. For ex-
ample, for system faults we can plan mitigations by using adaptation mechanisms of a
given control system architecture.
Jha and Raman [8] discuss the synthesis of vehicle trajectories from probabilistic
temporal logic assertions. Synthesized trajectories take into account perception uncer-
tainty through approximation of sensed obstacles by combining Gaussian polytopes. In
a similar context, Rizaldi and Althoff [10] formalize safe driving policies to derive safe
control strategies implementing worst-case braking scenarios in autonomous driving.
They apply a hybrid-trace-based formalization of physics required for model checking
of recorded [10] and planned [11] strategies. [8,10,11] discuss low-level control for a
specific class of driving scenarios, whereas our approach provides for (i) the investi-
gation and combination of many related operational situations, thus, forming a more
comprehensive perspective of driving safety, (ii) regarding various kinds of hazards
that might play a role in high- and low-level control beyond safe and optimal trajectory
planning and collision avoidance.
Wei et al. [14] describe an autonomous driving platform, capable of bringing vehi-
cles to a safe state and stop, i.e., activating a fail-operational mode on critical failure,
and a limp-home mode on less critical failure. These are mitigation strategies we can
assess in our framework. Their work elaborates on designing a specific class of ar-
chitectures. Additionally, we provide an approach to systematically evaluate risks and,
consequently, derive an architecture design.
Babin et al. [1] propose a system reconfiguration approach developed with the
Event-B method in a correct-by-construction fashion using a behavior pattern similar to
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Vehicle World
Driver
RoadEnv
Σs Σp Σ
Abstraction for
State Modeling
Abstraction for
Predicate Modeling
Abstraction for
Hazard Analysis
Fig. 1: Abstractions for state and predicate modeling, and for hazard analysis.
our approach (particularly, Fig. 2b). Reconfiguration as one way to mitigate faults is dis-
cussed in this work. Wardzin´ski [13] discusses hazard identification and mitigation for
autonomous vehicles by predetermined risk assessment (i.e., with safety barriers) and
dynamic risk assessment. For both, he provides argumentation patterns for creating AV
safety cases. In addition to his work, the abstraction and the method we propose covers
both paradigms in one framework. We provide formal notions of all core concepts.
3 Abstraction for Run-time Hazard Mitigation
Fig. 1 depicts three abstractions—Σs, Σp, and Σ—for run-time hazard mitigation in
AVs. The state space Σs pertains to the quantization of continuous signals from the
physical world encompassing the driver (drv), the vehicle (veh), and the road envi-
ronment (renv). For instance, the quantity speed is represented by the discrete state
variable veh.speed, which in turn is used to formulate predicates to obtain the abstract
state space Σp. For example, a predicate over sensor values ppveh.speed, veh.loc,
renv.mapq can encode exitTunnel , an invariant constraining the activity of leaving a
tunnel. We describe this two-staged abstraction in more detail in [6].
Here, we will work with the risk state space Σ whose concepts—actions, hazard
phases, their composition and ordering—are discussed below:
Actions. Let A be a set of actions. We abstract from control loop behaviors within and
across operational situations by distinguishing four classes of actions: endangerments
E , mitigationsM (see Fig. 2b), mishaps Em, and ordinary actionsAo. Note that actions
can take place in one or more out of the three domains, drv, veh, and renv, depending
on the quantities they modify. We require E ,M,Ao, Em Ă A.
Definition 1 (Hazard Phases). Let H be a set of hazards. Given h P H, endangerment
actions eh , ehm P A, and nh P Nzt0u mitigation actions mhj P A, we define the phases
of a hazard h as the set Ph “ t0, eh , ehmuYtmhj | j P Nzt0u^j ď nhu whose elements
denote the following:
0 hazard h is (inact)ive,
eh hazard h has been (act)ivated by an action eh ,
ehm (act)tivated hazard h has contributed to a mishap by an action e
h
m, and
mhj hazard h has been (mit)igated by an action m
h
j .
For each hazard h, Fig. 2a depicts Ph as a transition system where |Ph| “ nh ` 3, the
indices s, e, c, i1, . . . , in ď nh, the state mit subsumes nh ´ 1 phases, act subsumes
phases eh and ehm . For example, in the vehicle domain, m
h
s can model degradation
transitions and mhe or m
h
c can model repair transitions.
From all the sets of hazard phases, we compose a tuple space as follows:
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inact
mit
act
ehpactivateq
mhs
pstart mitigateq
mhe
pend mitigateq
mhc pcompletely mitigateq
eh
eh , ehm
pendanger
or mishapq
mhi1 , . . . ,m
h
in pinter-mitigateq
(a) Phase model of a hazard h.
saf haz mis
Ao
E
M
E
MM
Em
(b) Regions of a risk structure.
Fig. 2: Core concepts for building a risk state space Σ.
Definition 2 (Risk State Space). Based on Definition 1, we define the risk state space
Σ as the set of |H|-tuples
tpph1 , . . . , ph|H|q | @i P t1, . . . , |H|u : hi P H^ phi P Phiu .
We call any subset of Σ a region. Let σ, σ1 P Σ with σ “ pph1 , . . . , ph|H|q and
σ1 “ pp1h1 , . . . , p1h|H|q. To quantify risk in scenarios of endangerment and mitigation
strategies (Table 1), we define a partial order over Σ:
Definition 3 (Mitigation Order). Let Ph be a set of phases for hazard h (Definition 1)
and ăh “ tpeh, 0q, peh,mhj q, pmhj , 0q, pehm, ehq | mhj P Phu. By the reflexive transitive
closure1 ĺh“ tpp, pq | p P Phu Y Ťně1 ănh , we define the mitigation order ĺm Ď
Σ ˆΣ, for states σ, σ1 P Σ, as follows:
σ ĺm σ1 ô @i P t1, . . . , |H|u : phi ĺh p1hi .
Intuitively, σ ăm σ1 denotes “σ1 is better or further in mitigation than σ.”2
4 Concepts for Run-time Hazard Mitigation
In this section, we explain the core concepts of deriving a risk structure for a specific
operational situation. Using the risk state space Σ and actions A, we define the notions
of risk structure, risk region, and operational situation:
Definition 4 (Risk Structure). A risk structure is a weighted labeled transition system
pΣ,A, ∆,Wq with
– a set Σ called the risk state space (Definition 2),
– a set A of actions used as transition labels,
– a relation ∆ Ď Σ ˆAˆΣ called labeled transition relation, and
– a set W of partial functions w : pΣYAY∆q ÑWw called weights where the set
Ww can be, e.g. N,R, r0, 1s, or tm, c, fu.3
1 Here, for a relation R, Rn represents the composition of relations.
2 We use the convention σ ăm σ1 ” σ ĺm σ1 ^ σ ‰ σ1.
3 (m)arginal, (c)ritical, (f)atal; for other examples of severity scales, see [4].
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To capture the notions of endangerment scenario and mitigation strategy (Table 1) based
on ∆, we consider paths and strategies:
Definition 5 (Paths, Strategies, and Reachability). By convention, we write σ aÝÑ σ1
for pσ, a, σ1q P ∆. Then, for n, l P Nzt0u, a path is a sequence σ0 a0ÝÑ . . . σn´1 an´1ÝÑ
σn. By ∆l we denote the set of all paths of length l and by ∆8 “ Ťlą0∆l all paths
over ∆. Furthermore, we call a set S Ă ∆8 a strategy. By reach∆ : Σ Ñ 2Σ with
reach∆pσq “ tσu Y tσ1 P Σ | Dσ aÝÑ . . . a
1ÝÑ σ1 P ∆8u, we denote the set of states
reachable in ∆ from a state σ.
Endangerments. We consider an action a P A as an endangerment, i.e., a P E , if
σ ąm σ1 for a transition pσ, a, σ1q P ∆. The class E models steps of endangerment
scenarios. For example, a can stem from faults in drv, veh, and renv.
Mitigations. We consider an action a P A as a mitigation, i.e., a P M, if σ ăm σ1
for a transition pσ, a, σ1q P ∆. The class M models steps of mitigation strategies. One
objective of a good mitigation strategy is to achieve a stable safe state.
Operational Situations. States and regions inΣ both correspond to subsets ofΣs (Sec-
tion 3). To limit the scope of a risk analysis, we use an operational situation which
combines an initial region with a (reasonably weak) invariant holding along the driving
scenarios in a specific road environment.
Definition 6 (Operational Situation). An operational situation is a tuple pΣ0, tσ P
Σs | ppσquq where Σ0 Ď Σ and p is an invariant over Σs including all representations
of Σ0 in Σs. Let O be the set of all operational situations.
Below, we will work with a risk structure Ros “ pΣ,A, ∆,Wq and assume a fixed
operational situation os P O associated with Ros . Hence, we use R solely.
Risk Regions. We consider specific subsets of Σ called risk regions, particularly, the
safe region saf , the hazardous region haz , and the mishap region mis (see Fig. 2b).
Safety engineers aim at the design of mitigations which (i) avoid mis and (ii) react to
endangerments as early and effectively as possible. Then, Em reduces to unavoidable
actions from so-called near-mishaps still in haz towards mis . For example, we consider
a successfully deployed airbag to be in M such that mis is not reached in such an
accident (more in Section 7).
Our definitions of risk regions depend on R: First, mis “ tpph1 , . . . , ph|H|q P Σ |
Di P t1, . . . , |H|u : phi “ ehimu. We require mishaps to be final, i.e., @σ P mis : reach∆pσq “tσu. Second, saf and haz vary with a given operational situation. Moreover, they can
be defined based on, e.g. weights and equivalences. However, p0, . . . , 0q P saf and, for
an os , we start in the safe region iff Σ0 Ď saf .
Weights. By associating weights with elements ofR, we quantify further details on the
physical phenomena of the controlled process relevant for risk analysis.
For example, given δ “ pσ, eh , σ1q P ∆ with eh P E , the probability of endanger-
ment prpδq P r0, 1s yields the probability that hazard h gets activated in σ1 by perform-
ing eh in σ. Furthermore, given δ “ pσ,mhj , σ1q P ∆ with mhj PM,
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– the probability of mitigation prpδq P r0, 1s yields the probability that hazard h gets
mitigated in σ1 by performing mhj in σ.
– the cost of mitigation cspδq P N yields the potential effort (i.e., time, energy, other
resources) of performing the mitigation mhj .
For any mishap σ P mis , svpσq P tm, c, fu specifies its severity. Depending on the
abstraction, we can use qualitative (as shown above) or quantitative scales for sv and cs.
Anyway, we assume to have operators for sv and cs, e.g. see Fig. 3a.
Weights are typically calculated from measurements of the controlled process. For
example, the estimation of prpσ,mhj , σ1q might be result of a controllability analysis of
mhj in σ (of an operational situation). Moreover, further quantities (e.g. risk priority)
might be (i) calculated from weights, (ii) be propagated along ∆, and (iii) lead to an
update of weights.
Risk Priority. Given σ P Σ,mis 1 Ď mis , and a function rp : Σ Ñ tm, c, fu, we can
compute the minimum partial risk priority
rppσq “ Prpσ Ñ ♦mis 1q ¨sv mintσ1 P pmis 1 X reach∆pσqq | svpσ1qu (1)
where Prpσ Ñ ♦mis 1q P r0, 1s denotes the probability4 that from σ some mishap
σ1 P mis 1 is eventually (♦) reached in R. This definition implements a traditional
measure of risk analysis (see, e.g. [4]), referring to the minimum negative outcome (i.e.,
damage, injury, harm, loss) possibly reachable from σ in a specific operational situation
os P O. Note that for σ P mis , rppσq “ svpσq.
Equivalences over Σ. For simplification of complex risk structures R, we can con-
struct equivalence classes over states. From the structure of states in Σs, the dynamics
in Σs, and the elements of the control system architecture (Section 1), we give a brief
informal overview of equivalences over Σ to be considered:
We speak of feature equivalence, σ «f σ1, iff both, σ and σ1 map to the same set
of active features of the control system, i.e., in-the-loop no matter whether they are
fully operational, faulty, or degraded. Note that out-of-the-loop features can be faulty,
deactivated, or in standby mode. Next, we speak of degradation equivalence, σ «d σ1,
iff σ «f σ1 and both states share the same set of degraded features. Furthermore,
we speak of hazard (or fault) equivalence, σ «h σ1, iff @i P t1, . . . , |H|u : phi P
Phizt0u ô p1hi P Phizt0u, and, particularly, of mishap equivalence, σ «hm σ1, iff
@i P t1, . . . , |H|u : phi “ ehim ô p1hi “ ehim . Based on «h, we finally define:
Definition 7 (Mitigation Equivalence). Based on Definition 3, two states σ, σ1 P Σ
are mitigation equivalent, written σ «m σ1, iff
σ «h σ1 ^ @i P t1, . . . , |H|u : phi ąh ehi ô p1hi ąh ehi .
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m c f
m “sv ăsv ăsv
c ąsv “sv ăsv
f ąsv ąsv “sv
¨sv m c f
l m m m
m m m c
h m c f
(a) The operators “sv,ăsv,ąsv
and ¨sv where ěsv ” “sv ^ ąsv.
Partially
covered 
states ?
=0
Endangerment
For each subset of 
hazards H': 
If endangerment eH' 
applies, add eH' and 
new state '
Next partially 
e-covered 
state ?
Yes
Yes
No
Mitigation
For each subset of 
hazards H': 
Identify appropriate 
mitigation mH', add 
mH' and new state '
Next partially 
m-covered 
state ?
Yes
No
No
(b) Scheme for incremental construction of R by
constructRS.
Fig. 3: Operators and scheme
5 Construction of Risk Structures
In this section, we describe an incremental and forward5 reasoning approach to building
a risk structure R.
Identification of Hazards. Throughout the construction of R, we assume to have a
procedure hazId for the identification of a set of hazards H based on a fixed control
loop design L of a class of AVs and their environments, and a fixed set O1 Ă O of
operational situations (Definition 6). Failure mode effects and fault-tree analysis (see,
e.g. [4]) incorporate widely practiced schemes for hazId.
Building the Risk Structure. Fig. 3b shows the main steps of a procedure constructRS
which, given a setH and after termination, returns all elements of a complete risk struc-
tureR. Here, completeness is relative to H and means thatR can no more be extended
by (i) states which are reachable by existing actions in A, (ii) actions which allow
reaching non-visited states in Σ, (iii) transitions in ∆ which are technically possible
and probable, and (iv) further knowledge by extending the domains of weights. Based
on Fig. 3b, Algorithm 1 refines constructRS for a control loop L and an operational
situation os P O1.
The while-loop (cf. line 2) accounts for the alternation between adding endanger-
ments and mitigations. By using the maps rve and rvm (cf. lines 2, 3, 14, 17, 26), the
algorithm keeps track of the endangerment- and mitigation-coverage of visited states,
i.e., for which hazards σ has already been visited.
We assume to have (i) a function estimateL,os (cf. lines 9, 11, 22, 23) which acts
as an oracle for weights (Section 4) depending on pL, os q, and (ii) a function poss (cf.
lines 6, 20) which acts as an oracle for determining the technical possibility of newly
identified transitions.
The first for-loop checks for the addition of new transitions to ∆ (cf. line 7). The
transition constructor activate returns a state with the given hazard or mishap activated
4 See, e.g. [2] for details about probabilistic temporal logic and reasoning.
5 For generation of R, backward reasoning is the alternative not shown here.
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Algorithm 1 constructRSpL, os q
1: Σ “ Σ0,@σ P Σ0 : rvmpσq “ rvepσq “ H
2: while H “ hazIdpL, os q and Dσ P Σzmis : Hzprvepσq Y rvmpσqq ‰ H do
3: for all σ P Σzmis and H1 Ď Hzrvepσq do Ź extend endangerments
4: if pσ1, eH1j q Ð activatepσ,H1q then Ź state/jth action estab. H1 or mishap
5: δ Ð pσ, eH1j , σ1q
6: if posspδq then Ź add endangerment?
7: pΣ, E ,∆, rvepσ1qq Ð pΣ Y tσ1u, E Y teH1j u,∆Y tδu,Hq
8: if σ1 P mis then
9: svpσ1q Ð estimateL,os psv, σ1q Ź severity of mishap
10: end if
11: prpδq Ð estimateL,os ppr, δq Ź probability of endangerment
12: end if
13: else Ź activate returns empty tuple
14: rvepσq Ð rvepσq YH1 Ź i.e., H1 activated and mishap added
15: end if
16: end for
17: for all σ P Σzmis and H1 Ď Hzrvmpσq do Ź extend mitigations
18: if pσ1,mH1j q Ð mitigatepσ,H1q then Ź state/jth action mitig. H1 from σ
19: δ Ð pσ,mH1j , σ1q
20: if posspδq then Ź add mitigation?
21: pΣ,M,∆, rvmpσ1qq Ð pΣ Y tσ1u,MY tmH1j u,∆Y tδu,Hq
22: prpδq Ð estimateL,os ppr, δq Ź probability of mitigation
23: cspδq Ð estimateL,os pcs, δq Ź cost of mitigation
24: end if
25: else Ź mitigate returns empty tuple
26: rvmpσq Ð rvmpσq YH1 Ź i.e., all options for H1 are checked
27: end if
28: end for
29: Σ Ð Σztσ P Σ | σ R Ťσ0PΣ0 reach∆pσ0qu Ź removing unreachable states
30: . . . Ź further simplifications
31: end while
32: return pΣ, E YM,∆, tsv, pr, csuq
(i.e., phases eh or ehm). Note that activate can generate σ
1 P mis reachable via eH1m P
Em.
The second for-loop checks for the addition of new transitions to ∆ (cf. line 21).
The transition constructor mitigate returns a state with the given hazards H1 mitigated
to a new phase mhhi P Ph for each h P H1.
Note that none of the constructors is idempotent, mitigate can construct several
mitigation phases for each hazard (cf. lines 18, 26) and activate can construct two
activation phases, eh and ehm, both with the corresponding actions (cf. lines 4, 14).
Model Reduction. To keep reasoning efficient, we have to apply reachability-preserving
simplifications to R (cf. lines 29f), e.g. equivalences such as in Definition 7. The mit-
igation order (Definition 3) helps in reducing the state space and in merging actions
modifying phases of the same hazards (i.e., by hazard equivalence).
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Abstraction from Control System Architecture. In both stages of Algorithm 1, we
need to analyze the given or envisaged architecture and to identify state variables, e.g.
for software modules, at an appropriate level of granularity.
In the endangerment stage (lines 3ff), we can perform dependability analyses to
identify events that can activate causal factors. Off-line, we then design specific mea-
sures to reach the safe region again, and, on-line, we design generic measures to be
refined at run-time.
Moreover, the mitigation stage (lines 17ff) helps to revise a control system architec-
ture, e.g. by adding redundant execution units and degradation paths. Moreover, we can
pursue off-line synthesis of respective parts of the control system architecture.
Hazard Mitigation Planning. First, hazId is hybrid in the sense that it (i) performs
the sensing of already known endangerment scenarios (e.g. near-collision detection,
component fault diagnosis) on-line, and (ii) allows the addition of new scenarios from
off-line hazard analysis.
Second, a simple planner would continuously perform shortest weighted path search
in R to keep a list of all available lowest-risk mitigation paths (Definition 5) and coor-
dinate optimized lower-level controllers.
Based on these two steps, we assume R to be continuously updated according to
the available information (i.e., adding or modifying endangerments and mitigations ac-
cording to known scenarios). It is important to have powerful and precise update mecha-
nisms, highly responsive actuation, and short control loop delays. Main issues of signal
processing are briefly mentioned in Section 7.
The notion of safest possible state (SG, Section 1) is governed by the accuracy of
Σs (Section 3), the completeness of the results of hazId, and the exhaustiveness of R
for a fixed setting L, os . According to Definition 3, for a pair pσ, σ1q P Σ ˆ Σ, we
might say that σ1 is the safest possible state iff we have
Eσ2 P reach∆Mpσq : σ1 ăm σ2 (2)
where ∆M “ ∆ztpσ1, a, σ2q P Σ | a P Equ. Any controller for SG would have to find
and completely conduct a shortest plan for pσ, σ1q to reach σ1.
6 Example: Fail-operational Driver Assistance
Elaborating on an example in [6], we apply our framework and algorithm to hazard
analysis and elaboration of mitigation strategies. We use the abbreviations introduced
in Section 1.
Identifying an Operational Situation. We consider the situation os P O: “AV is
taking an exit in a tunnel, at a speed between 30 and 90 km/h, with the driver being
properly seated, and the next road segments contain a crossing.” Fig. 4b depicts the
corresponding street segment.
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Sensor s1 ˝
Sensor s2 ˝
Sensor s3 ˝
AP
ACC, LKA
Safety Core
Sensor s4 ˝
Sensor s5 ˝
TDA
ACCD , LKAD
OpBreak ˝
OpThrottle ˝
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‚ Break
‚ Throttle
‚ Steering
(a) Hardware architecture. (b) Considered street segments.
Fig. 4: Two cutouts of the road vehicle domain.
Modeling the Road Vehicle Domain. Fig. 4a shows a simplified control system ar-
chitecture used for driver assistance systems. We model the relevant state information
according to the abstractions described in Section 3. State variables commonly used for
road vehicles are listed in Table 2. For Σs, we assume to have the variables6 (prefixed
with their domains, in parentheses their types): veh.loc (coordinate), veh.speedvec
(vector of floats), renv.map (street map7), and drv.pos (enumeration). veh denotes all
variables of this domain. For Σp, we identify the following predicates8:
exitTunnel ” veh.route Ă renv.mapX pPexit Y Ptunnelq
crossingAhead ” veh.routeX prenv.mapX Pcrossingq ‰ H
drvSeated ” drv.pos “ seated
Furthermore, we use unspecified predicates:
inTunnel ” p4pveh.loc, renv.mapq A ” p5pveh.faultsq
L ” p6pveh.faultsq R ” p7pdrv.vigilanceq
inCrossing ” pxpveh.loc, renv.mapq tunnelAhead ” pypveh.loc, renv.mapq
The invariant for os is pos ” exitTunnel ^ drvSeated^ crossingAhead. Note that
the AP is active in the initial state σ0 associated with os .
6 Variable types and usage depend on the AV sensors and car2X services through which they are
measured. We assume individual error estimators for all variables.
7 With, e.g. topological coordinate system, information about tunneled parts.
8 Here, Px refers to a pattern for the street map element class x which acts like a filter on the
street map data type. For sake of brevity, we omit details of sensor fusion and street map
calculations required for evaluating these predicates.
Table 2: Exemplary state variables of the different domains.
Domain State Variables Abbreviation
Driver Physical presence, consciousness, vigilance, . . . drv
Vehicle Speed, loc(ation), fault conditions, . . . veh
RoadEnv Daylight, weather, traffic, road, . . . renv
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Table 3: Model after two increments (R2). ‖t denotes true parallelism, ; concatenation.
1+2 Description Model Increment
Σs Introduce faults (e.g. from fault model) veh.faults
H AP sensor s1 fault A ” p5pveh.faultsq
H TDA LKAD software fault L ” p6pveh.faultsq
Σ End. phases: Comb. of A and L AL ” A^ L, A1L ” A1 ^ L
A1L . . . “LKAD faulty” ^ “TDA active” ^ “AP out of the loop”
E Actions establishing A and L (e.g. from ar-
chitecture analysis)
f A , f L E “ tf A , f Lu
W Probability of endangerment e.g. prpf Aq :“ .01, prpf Lq :“ .02
Severity AL. . . “high-speed collision” AL P mis , svpALq “ f
M mA1 . . . “AP fail-op. by degrad. to TDA” mA1 ” foTDA
mA2 . . . “deact. ACC” ‖t “driver in loop” mA2 ” off ACCD ‖t onDrv
mA3 . . . “AP fail-silent” mA3 ” fsAP ‖t onDrv
mL1 . . . “TDA fail-silent and warn” mL1 ” fsL2;warnL2
mL2 . . . “TDA total fail-silent” ‖t “immediate
handover to driver”
mL2 ” fs˚ ‖t onDrv , mL3 ” mL4 ” mL2
Σ Mitigation phases: A1 . . . “s1 fault” ^ “TDA active,”
A2 . . . “s1 fault” ^ “handed to driver” ^ “TDA active”
A3 . . . “s1 fault” ^ “handed to driver” ^ “AP out of the loop”
L1 . . . “TDA out of the loop” ^ “driver warned”
A1L1 . . . “AP and TDA out of the loop” ^ “handed to driver”
W Probability of mitigation e.g. prpmA3 q “ .50
Cost of mitigation e.g. cspmA3 q “ 3
R Simplifications: e.g. A2 «m A3 (cf. Definition 7)
Notation. In the following (Figures 5a, 5b, and 6), for each state, H denotes that the
hazard H is active (phase eH ), H that H contributed to a mishap (phase eHm, only in
Table 3), and Hi that its ith mitigation phase is active (phase mHi ). We do not indicate
hazards which are in phase 0.
Incremental Forward Construction of the Risk Structure. Refining the regions
haz and saf (Fig. 2b), we construct R from three hazards A,L, and R identified by
hazId (Section 5). Table 3 sketches the construction of the first and second increments
towards R2, including the events A ”“AP sensor s1 fault” and L ”“TDA LKAD soft-
ware fault.”
Fig. 5a shows∆ forR2. According to Algorithm 1, we try to add the fault condition
L to σ0 and other states inR1 (i.e., black states in Fig. 5a). Based on the action f L , this
step yields the states L,A1L, and AL. Then, a mitigation step yields the states L1 and
AL1 and, finally, another step of endangerment analysis based on the action f A yields
AL1.
Risk Priority Estimation. From the state AL with svpALq “ f , we can derive, e.g.
rppA1q according to Eq. (1). We can as well derive rppA2q “ rppA3q “ m because
reaching AL by driving assistance control is no more possible.
Equivalences and Model Reduction. In Fig. 5a, for example,
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Fig. 5: Risk structure R2 and its simplification R12.
Table 4: Adding endangerments for the third increment (R3).
3 Description Model Increment
H Driver reaction time increases. R ” p7pdrv.vigilanceq
Σ States R,LR,AR,ALR,
A1R, A1LR, AL1R, L1R
E Action eR . . . “driver looks sidewards”
‖t “hands go off steering wheel”
eR E “ tf A , f L , eRu
M mL3 ” warn ‖t normalStop
– A2 «m A3 because in both states A is mitigated and other hazards are inactive (0,
cf. Definition 7),
– A1 «f σ0 because in A1 the degraded variants of LKA and ACC, i.e., LKAD and
ACCD, are in the loop,
– A1 «d A1L because in both states LKAD and ACCD are in the loop,
– A1L «f AL because in both states, LKA and ACC are in the loop, and
– A1L ffh AL because ACC (part of AP) is faulty and ACCD (part of TDA) is fully
operational.
Simplifications can be derived from Fig. 5a, where we might (i) merge two states
pσ1, σ2q P «d if rppσ1q “ rppσ2q, or (ii) merge two consecutive states on a “safe”
mitigation path, e.g. from any σ P haz to σ0 if actions such as limp-home, shutdown,
and repair are feasible from σ.
Fig. 5b shows a simplification R12 of R2. We omit irrelevant transitions (f L ) and
collapse the mitigation-equivalent («m) states A2 and A3. Consequently, with the states
A2,3 and AL1 we get a refinement of saf . According to Eq. (2), A2 is a safest possible
state reachable from A.
Next, Table 4 and Fig. 6 describe a cut-out of R3 after the third increment where
we added the event R ”“Driver reaction time increases.”
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7 Discussion of Limitations, Applicability, and Strengths
The abstraction Σs (Section 3) is subject to standard signal processing steps, i.e., sam-
pling of continuous signals at discrete time points, quantization of dense domains to
form finite domains, and clamping of domains. We assume all signals to be sampled
faster then their respective NYQUIST period, sufficiently small quantums, and suffi-
ciently large ranges of data types. Furthermore, we expect a mitigation planner to be
fast enough (sufficiently low latency) to provide outputs for effective and optimal con-
trol. Note that the risk structure abstracts from the low-level parameters necessary for
actual control of mitigations which takes place at the level of Σs.
The treatment of these issues will determine how accurate mitigations can take place
at the right time and duration. In addition, we might consider higher-order mitigations
to handle adverse impacts of first-order mitigations. However, such impacts have to be
identified as hazards to get recognized in R.
Elaborating on risk regions (Section 4), mis represents mitigation-less harmful
states, however, haz includes all states where mitigations are feasible. Consequently,
we allow “bad things to happen” as long as we have partial mitigations, e.g. an airbag
would prevent from reaching mis at a certain probability.
8 Conclusion and Future Work
We presented risk structures as a model to design high-level controllers capable of run-
time hazard mitigation, i.e., of maintaining or reaching the safest states in a given op-
erational situation. We sketched an incremental approach to develop mitigation strate-
gies. Safety measures are a combination of reducing or eliminating endangerments with
constructing or strengthening mitigations. Risk structures can help to derive safety re-
quirements for a control system architecture. Moreover, they can lay a basis for the
evaluation, choice, and combination of mitigation strategies. Our example highlights
challenges to tackle in hazard mitigation of fail-operational automated driving. Finally,
we indicate how several formalisms—temporal specification, predicate abstraction, and
transition systems—can coherently aid in hazard mitigation planning.
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Future Work. Based on risk structures, we aim to evaluate criteria such as (i) time,
energy, and cost of mitigations, (ii) the role of human intervention, (iii) resilience to
change of operational situations, (iv) control system simplicity.
In the next steps, we want to efficiently automate the derivation of acceptable miti-
gation strategies, and synthesize feasible and affordable mitigation strategies. Based on
weights, we can define desirable properties of mitigation strategies implemented in R,
e.g. monotonicity.
Definition 8 (Mitigation Monotonicity). Let S Ă ∆8 be a strategy (Definition 5) and
n P Nzt0u. We call S mitigation monotonous iff for each path σ0 a0ÝÑ . . . an´1ÝÑ σn P
S : @i P t0, . . . , n´ 1u : rppσiq ěsv rppσi`1q.
Intuitively, during planning we seek mitigation paths containing only endangerments,
if any, which do not increase risk priority. This might, however, be a definition to be
relaxed for practical use by, e.g. allowing rp-distances.
Given that we use our algorithm off-line, it is important to make the poss and
estimateL,os steps in Algorithm 1 interactive for the safety engineer. Moreover, in-
stead of elaborating os -specific risk structures off-line, we aim at using our algorithm
to generate such structures on-line given a specific operational situation, and combine
this with a transition system switching between operational situations. Given that we
use our algorithm on-line, it is important to develop simplification rules to be applied
to Σ based on the equivalences in Section 4.
We plan to evaluate our results in the automotive industry whose aims include
checking whether fail-operational extensions of given in-vehicle network architectures
for automated driving can be made acceptably safe.
Finally, for a regulatory agency to apply our approach to AV, we have to show (i)
our approach using a large example involving several operational situations, (ii) how
our abstraction can be verified, and (iii) that the limits of controllers do not constrain
our approach to achieve safe stable control loops.
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